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Low inflation and
Central Bank Independence
The following is adapted from a speech given by
Robert T. Parry, President and Chief Executive
Officer ofthe Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Fran-
cisco, at the Commencement ceremonies ofthe
Economics Department at the University ofCali-
fornia, Berkeley, May 23, 1992.
The last three years marked one of the longest
periods of slow growth for the u.s. economy in
the postwar era. And the prospects are for mod-
est growth to continue for some time. One bright
spot in the economic picture, though, is inflation.
In 1991, the core rate of consumer inflation was
a little over 4 percent, and it will likely move
closer to 3 percent this year, a good improve-
ment over the 5 percent rate in 1990.
It is tempting in such time to be complacent
about controlling inflation. But this would be a
mistake. The principal long-term goal of the Fed-
eral Reserve is achieving low inflation. And in
the long run, a core inflation rate in the 3-5 per-
cent range is still unacceptably high for the
health of the economy.
Sticking to policies that control inflation is espe~
cially important now, not only in the U.S. but
also in many of the major economies of the
world. Japan and Germany, two of the staunchest
inflation-fighting countries, are struggling against
pressures to ease in the face of their worst eco-
nomic weakness in a decade. And the European
Community is making history with its plans for
monetary union and'for a unified central bank
-a so-called EuroFed. Under the Maastricht
Accord, EC member countries will assign the
conduct of their monetary policy to an inde-
pendent, supranational authority, with price
stability as its prime goal.
The strength of their inflation-fighting policies
and the structure of the institutions that shape
them will have a profound influence on world
prosperity in the years to come. This Letter
provides a brief perspective on the goal of low
inflation, and how a central bank's conduct and
structure can contribute to achieving that goal.
Why is low inflation desirable?
The main benefit of low inflation is that it re-
duces economic risk. There is persuasive evi-
dence that the lower the level of inflation, the
lower the uncertainty about inflation. Therefore,
low inflation leads to better planning and con-
tracting by business and labor. It also reduces the
risk premia in long-term interest rates associated
with the uncertainty of future inflation, thereby
increasing capital formation and ptoductivity.
And since unexpected changes in inflation create
many arbitrary transfers of wealth and income,
low inflation reduces wasteful hedging activity
against these transfers. Furthermore, our tax
structure and most financial contracts are only
partially indexed for inflation, so it creates tax
and financial distortions. And complete index-
ation is a complex task with known problems.
This description of the benefits of low inflation is
not just an academic abstraction. We all learned
about the flip side of these effects firsthand, as
inflation surged during the 1970s. By 1980, the
public, the academic world, and the Fed were all
convinced of the terrible costs of high inflation
and of the need to get it under control.
But there are transition costs to reducing infla-
tion. The major cost is a temporary rise in un-
employment. Of course, there is no permanent
tradeoff between inflation and unemployment.
But the tradeoff is there in the short run, and it is
painful. Ultimately, how painful this transition
cost is depends on the public's expectations of
future inflation; and the public's expectations of
future inflation depend on whether the central
bank's anti-inflation policy is perceived to be
credible.
Credibility and independence
How does a central bank achieve credibility?
To borrow a famous phrase: "You do it theFABSF
.old-fashioned way: You have to earn it." For
example, suppose the central bank compromises
its commitment to low inflation and follows an
expansionary policy in order to boost output and
cut unemployment, ifonly in the short run. This
might work a time or two. But it will not work
over and over. Sooner or later, the public catches
on. They figure the central bank is not serious
about low inflation policy anymore, so inflation
expectations go up, and there is no short-term
reduction in unemployment. In fact, it is even
possible that unemployment rises rather than de-
clines. Clearly, then, the ability of a central bank
to deliver low inflation depends critically on the
credibility it achieves over time through consis-
tent policy action.
Since the 1970s, the Fed has made some major
strides in improving its credibility. Over a decade
ago, the Fed announced a goa! of bringing infla-
tion down from the double-digit levels ofthe late
19705. It stuck with this policy, despite a rise in
unemployment from 5.9 percent in 1979 to 9.7
percent in 1982-83, and it succeeded in getting
inflation down to the 4-5 percent range by the
mid-1980s.
Central bank credibility and the ability to deliver
low inflation have been linked to central bank
independence. That link can be illuminated by
examining the Fed's independence. The Federal
Reserve System derives its power from, and ulti-
mately is responsible to, Congress. Therefore, it
is not independent ofgovernment. Nor should it
be otherwise in a democratic society like ours.
Rather, the Fed is independent within govern-
ment. The Fed is not obliged to consult the ad-
ministration on monetary policy decisions. But it
does brief administration officials regularly, and
the Chairman reports to Congress twice a year
on monetary policy and gives testimony many
other times. In contrast, low independence is
typically associated with countries where the
central bank is subservient to the Treasury or
Ministry of Finance.
The point of linking independence and credi-
bility is the concern that government could exert
"undue influence" over monetary policy. In
other words, it could try to compromise long-
term economic goals in order to gain short-term
political objectives. A central bank that is insu-
lated from such "undue" government pressures
-that is, a central bank that is independent-is
in a much better position to makeacredible
commitment to lo\-v inflatio~.
Do independent central banks
actually deliver lower inflation?
A fair bit of research has been done on this issue,
and several cross~country studies (for example,
Bade and Parkin 1987, and Alesina 1988) suggest
that independent central banks do tend to deliver
lower rates of inflation. For example, these studies
find that, among industrialized nations, the cen-
tral banks with the most formal independence
are in Germany and Switzerland. And their infla-
tion rates are also among the lowest, averaging
about 2.6 percent and 3.4 percent annually in
the 1980s. The U.S. ranks next in terms of central
bank independence, with an average inflation
rate for the period of 4.7 percent. At the opposite
end of the spectrum are the central banks of the
U.K. and Italy, which have relatively little formal
independence and average inflation rates of6.6
and 9.9 percent, respectively.
But the relationship between formal central bank
independence and inflation performance is not
ironclad. The case ofJapan illustrates this clearly.
Since 1980, its inflation rate has been even lower
than Germany's and Switzerland's-without the
benefit of much of the formal independence of
other central banks. But thanks to its track record
in fighting inflation, and to consistent support
from the Ministry of Finance, its credibility is
strong. So, while credibility is essential, the Jap-
anese case illustrates that formal independence
is not.
But formal independence certainly can help.
This idea is being put into practice today, as
countries that have been plagued with high infla-
tion rates are enacting legislation to reshape their
conduct of monetary policy. For example, New
Zealand, Canada, and Chile all have passed laws
that mandate an explicit inflation goal or that
give their central banks more independence. In
Europe, most governments have anchored their
currencies, and hence their monetary policies, to
the independent Bundesbank. And the Maastricht
Accord calls on EC member countries to modifytheir legislation to ensure that their own central
banks have a greater degree of independence. In
fact, Italy recently passed a law transferring the.
power to change the discount rate from the Treas-
ury to the central bank. Similar proposals are
being considered in Argentina and in a number
of East European countries.
Conclusion
Achieving low inflation is the most significant
contribution that the Federal Reserve can make
to attaining the long-run, full-growth potential of
the U.S. economy. And the Fed's ability to deliver
low inflation, in turn, critically hinges on the
credibility of its commitment to a low-inflation
policy. A credible central bank is better able to
achieve a lower inflation rate without a pro-
longed economic downturn because the public
expects it to follow through with the policy long
enough to be successfuI.
The independence of the Fed within government
does help bolster and safeguard its credibility-
but it does not guarantee it. likewise, the move-
ment in many countries toward central bank
structures that are more independent does not
guarantee the credibility of their commitment to
low inflation. Whether the Fed or any other cen-
tral bank is credible depends ultimately on the
results of its policies. It is only by establishing a
consistent record of successful action that a cen-
tral bank can demonstrate that it puts enough
emphasis on inflation control to be a credible
inflation fighter.
Robert T. Parry
President and Chief Executive Officer
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